In many realms of historical writing, big is back. In some areas-historical archaeology, comparative sociology or world-systems theory-it never went away. In others, it clearly has disappeared, never to return: the globe-spanning universal histories associated with Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee seem unlikely to be imitated again, at least as lifelong, multi-volume projects by single authors driven by a comprehensive vision of civilisation.
1 Across the historical profession, the telescope rather than the microscope is increasingly the preferred instrument of examination; the long-shot not the close-up is becoming an ever-more prevalent picture of the past. A tight focus has hardly been abandoned, as the continuing popularity of biography and the utility of microhistory both amply show. However, it is being supplemented by broad panoramas of both space and time displayed under various names: "world history", "deep history" and "big history". This return to the longue durée presents challenges and opportunities for all historians: 2 here I want to consider its implications for the practice of intellectual history.
At its most ambitious, big history-so-called by its practitioners, who have now founded an International Big History Association-stretches back to the Big Bang itself. 3 This is a universal history that is coterminous with the universe itself, drawing on the findings of cosmology, astronomy, geology and evolutionary biology as well as more conventionally historical disciplines like archaeology and historical sociology. By contrast, "deep" history is relatively parochial, in that it delves only into the human past.
It is self-defined as "deep" largely because it breaches the barrier between "pre-history"
and history in the conventional sense of recorded history, the past as recoverable through the various signifying texts conscious constructed by agents who bequeathed them to the future. 4 Such deep history relies on genetics, neurophysiology and evolutionary biology, among other fields. Like the even bigger big history, it sees the conscious history of humans as both relatively brief and continuous with developments that long preceded the human ability to historicise themselves. By contrast, the comparatively unambitious "world" historians have usually confined themselves to a still narrower band of time, to thousands rather than tens of thousands or even billions of years, and to the Anthropocene in which humans shaped their environment and were shaped by it.
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Big history, in all its guises has been inhospitable to the questions of meaning and intention so central to intellectual history. This is not simply for the banal reason that the big historians usually scrutinise such a superficial slice of recorded history at the end of their grand sweeps: as Mark Twain deflatingly noted, "If the Eiffel Tower were now representing the world's age, the skin of paint on the pinnacle-knob at its summit would represent man's share of that age." 6 Nor is it just because human agency dwindles in significance in the face of cosmological or even archaeological time. Braudel's examples of these enduring elements of the collective, unmoving outillage mentale included the idea of the crusade, the practice of geometrical pictorial space and an "Aristotelian concept of the universe" that was not dethroned until the Scientific Revolution. According to Braudel, these were subject to the same imperative of "permanence and survival" that characterised the lives of transhumant shepherds, trapped by the rhythmic cycles of their flocks, or of city-sites fixed by their topographies and geographies. He found them to be similarly independent of the ruptures and inversions taking place at the level of histoire événementielle. The longue durée as defined by the Annales historians was therefore infertile territory for intellectual historians. As Franco
Venturi noted of their approach, "The whole 'geological' structure of the past is examined, but not the soil in which ideas themselves germinate and grow."
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Even as the historians of the longue durée were rejecting intellectual history, intellectual historians were inoculating themselves against the longue durée. Put as broadly as this, the parallels might be sound, but closer scrutiny reveals defining differences. No intellectual historian would now use Lovejoy's creaking metaphors of "unit-ideas" as chemical elements, nor would they assume that the biography of an idea could be written as if it had a quasi-biological continuity and identity through time, along with a life-cycle longer than that of any mortal human subject. There might be a family resemblance between the original history of ideas and its revenant namesake, but the kinship is artificial, not least because this new history of ideas has emerged in response to the profound critiques of Lovejoy's methods that emerged after his death in 1962. Indeed, this may not be so much a return as the reinvention of long-range intellectual history to become something quite different: a method that is robust, that can appeal to a broad academic and even non-academic readership, and that can bring intellectual history back into conversation with other forms of "big" history.
Out of this reinvention, I believe, we can effect a greatly overdue rapprochement between intellectual history and the longue durée.
To justify that rapprochement, let me offer three means which I hope will instantiate and illuminate this new breed of long-range intellectual history. The first is that we think of it as transtemporal history, on the analogy of transnational history. The second is that it should proceed by a method of serial contextualism by deploying the distinctive procedures of Anglo-American intellectual history, but by doing so diachronically as well as synchronically. And the third is a proposal to conceive the result of this transtemporal serial contextualism as a history in ideas to distinguish it from the distrusted and discredited "history of ideas" associated with Lovejoy and his acolytes.
What I want to do now is the explain each of these terms briefly and then to illustrate how I have been trying to put them into practice in writing a history of conceptions of civil war from Ancient Rome to the twenty-first century. The outcome of an openly admitted and consistently pursued serial contextualism would be what I have called a history in ideas. I take this to be a genre of intellectual history in which episodes of contestation over meaning form the stepping-stones in a transtemporal narrative constructed over a span of time extending over decades, if not centuries. The "ideas" structuring this history would not be hypostatised entities, making intermittent entries into the mundane world from the idealism's heavenly spheres, but rather focal points of arguments shaped and debated episodically across time with a conscious-or at least a provable connection-with both earlier and later instances of such struggles. Just as the history of the world has recently been suggestively told "in 100 objects" so a history in ideas can be narrated in a finite number of moments. 26 The chosen ideas should be linked through time, as well as in the freight of meanings they carry from their dialogue with the past and, occasionally, with the future. With these, perhaps rather abstract, prescriptions in mind, let me now give a sense of my ongoing attempt to write such a transtemporal, serially contextualist history in ideas around the key moments in the intellectual history of civil war from ancient Rome to the present. * * * * * Civil war is a prime candidate for a "history in ideas" because it has a history with an identifiable beginning, in the first century BCE, but as yet no discernible end. 27 It resists reification because it is both evaluative and descriptive: it cannot be abstracteddespite distinguished attempts to do so-but must be historicised. It is also an indispensable item in our political vocabulary, yet one whose application to events is never without controversy. This is in part because "civil war" occurs in both technical discourses and non-expert speech: any one of us might think we know what civil war is when we see it (or have it reported to us), but there are multiple communities of experts, such as international lawyers, political scientists and politicians themselves, who will beg to differ. The history of how "civil war" was used over more than two thousand years has both semantic continuities and conceptual ruptures, all of which were contested at almost every point. However, its very ubiquity in contemporary language contrasts markedly with its near-absence in the first century after its invention, and its global circulationthrough every European language and from those into other language groups-belies its original specificity within Roman legal discourse. Conflict over its meaning, as much as the meaning of conflict, has characterised its history since the very beginning and remains a distinguishing feature of that history's continuing force over the present. The episodes of civil strife escalated from rivalry and contentiousness to murder, and from murder to full-scale war; and this was the first army composed of Roman citizens to attack their own country as though it were a hostile power.
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Appian's description has particular value because it comes from an historian writing in Greek, whose language and traditions contained no precise equivalent for the term "civil war", a concept that was specifically and identifiably Roman in origin. 31 In the intellectual genealogy of civil war, as in so much else, all roads lead back to Rome. Their definition was the product of much debate and confusion among social scientists during the Cold War about the difference between civil war and other kinds of "internal warfare" (riot, rebellion, revolution, insurgency) and every element of it was designed to secure the boundaries of the definition against imprecision: it had to be a war (rather than any other kind of large-scale violence); it had to be internal to an existing state, but not exclusively so, in order to include those civil wars that drew in outside forces; it had to exclude one-sided massacres and genocides; and it left open the motivations of the participants, even as it implied that one side had legitimacy ("central government forces") while the other did not ("an insurgent force").
Each of these three overlapping definitions-from the second, the mid-nineteenth and the late twentieth centuries-exemplifies one broad era in the transtemporal history of The term was probably coined-I use the passive advisedly because its inventor is unknown-on the analogy of the civil law (ius civile), but bellum civile meant more precisely a war against cives or citizens. Rome's wars were, by definition, fought against external enemies, or hostes, the literally hostile antitheses to those who were bound into the civitas by the common ties of citizenship. And to be a war, a bellum, it had to be just, which a contention against one's fellow-citizens by definition could not be. CE. Yet, by the time Appian composed his history of Rome's intestine conflicts, war between citizens had occurred so often, and its shape had become so sharply defined, that his description of Sulla's march on the city encapsulated a consensus on its form.
Trumpets and standards were the visible signs, conventional warfare the means, and control of Rome the aim: all told, these were the identifying marks of civil war rather than the signs of mere tumult, dissension or sedition. Appian also implied the existence of a narrative, within which Sulla's assault was the original episode.
The works of Caesar, Sallust, Lucan, Tacitus, Plutarch, Appian, Florus and Augustine, to name only the most prominent, transmitted versions of that narrative throughout the Latin West until at least the late eighteenth century. There was what might be called the republican narrative of seemingly endless and recurrent civil wars arising from the very fabric of Roman civilisation itself: to be civilised at all was to be prone to civil war, and to suffer one civil war opened the way for further destructive dissensions within the commonwealth. Then there was a parallel imperial or Augustan narrative, which followed much the same pattern but held that the only cure for the pathology of civil war would be the restoration of monarchy or the exaltation of an emperor. "In this way", wrote Appian, "the Roman polity survived all kinds of civil disturbances to reach unity and monarchy": "an evident demonstration", agreed his late sixteenth-century English translator, "That peoples rule must give place, and Princes power prevayle."
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And finally there was a Christian narrative, constructed most famously by Augustine, the last great Roman historian, which presented Rome's pagan history as a catalogue of "those evils which were more infernal because internal" (quanto interiora, tanto miseriora), a series of "civil, or rather uncivil, discords" (discordiae civiles vel potius inciviles). 39 The popularity of these narratives of civil war as repetitive, cumulative and transformative, declined only in the period historians call "the Age of Revolutions", when
another narrative-of revolutions as similarly recurrent, sequential and transtemporalbegan to dethrone it. 40 As self-conscious revolutionaries rebranded civil wars as revolutions, it was no coincidence that, for instance, editions of the great Roman poet of civil war, Lucan, which had been issued almost annually across the eighteenth century, ceased, not to re-emerge into prominence until a later age of civil wars in the late twentieth century. and revolutions. 46 The expansiveness of the category generated anxiety about a lack of theoretical focus and dissatisfaction that the examples were too heterogeneous to be codified or counted. Data could not be theorized and theories lacked supporting data.
It was to solve this quandary that Melvin Small and David Singer generated the third definition of civil war I quoted earlier. They demanded a quantitative, rather than a qualitative definition "to minimize subjective bias" and, more pointedly, to "facilitate the construction of a data set", as a means of escaping what they deemed the conceptual morass of competing and inconsistent definitions of civil war. 47 The greatest problem with their definition is the number of conflicts it does not encompass. Their cut-off of 1000 battlefield deaths annually would exclude the Troubles in Northern Ireland, for which the death-toll was around 3500 fatalities between 1969 and 2001, with a peak of 479 in 1972. The condition of being "primarily internal" was specified as being "internal to the metropole", in order deliberately to exclude post-colonial wars of national liberation like the Algerian War. For all its striving to be neutral and objective, this idea of civil war was in fact highly contingent and contestable. 48 To paraphrase Winston Churchill, it was perhaps the worst definition of civil war one could imagine-except every other one that has been proposed over the last two centuries. This would hardly matter, were it not for the fact that it remains the reigning metric for a civil war among social scientists, and is thus the basis for data supplied to institutions like the World Bank But examples can be no more than exemplary; symptoms cannot approximate systems. Even my procedure of combining close, synchronic contextualisation with much broader diachronic sweeps of the longue durée may soon appear to be unfashionable and outdated rather than dashingly avant-garde. The manual accumulation and analysis of sources, to which intellectual historians have been accustomed for a century (and other historians for much longer), is not becoming obsolete, but it is ever increasingly incomplete: "distant reading" of large accumulations of sources now supplements close reading but cannot replace it. 51 The digital revolution's effects are only just beginning to be felt among intellectual historians but they will surely be transformative, both in terms 
